The theory of incentives: the principal-agent model
2002
331.01 L13
Disponible à Library
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Titre
The theory of incentives: the principal-agent model
Auteur
ISBN
978-0691091846
Mention d'impression
New Jersey Princeton Univ Pr 2002
Langue
Anglais
Description
421 pp.
Cote
331.01 L13
System Control No.
IF000015737
Résumé
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation?
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